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Abstract—Security is acknowledged as one of the main challen-
ges in the design and deployment of embedded circuits. Devices
need to operate on-the-field safely and correctly, even when at
physical reach of potential adversaries. One of the most powerful
techniques to compromise the correct functioning of a device
are fault injection attacks. They enable an active adversary to
trigger errors on a circuit in order to bypass security features
or to gain knowledge of security-sensitive information. There
are several methods to induce such errors. In this work we
focus on the injection of faults through the electromagnetic (EM)
channel. In particular, we document our efforts towards building
a suitable platform for EM pulse injection. We design a pulse
injection circuit that can provide currents over 20 A to an EM
injector in order to generate abrupt variations of the EM field
on the vicinity of a circuit. We validate the suitability of our
platform by applying a well-know attack on an embedded 8-bit
microcontroller implementing the AES block cipher. In particular,
we show how to extract the AES secret cryptographic keys stored
in the device by careful injection of faults during the encryption
operations and simple analysis of the erroneous outputs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Internet of Things is shaping an ecosystem
of ubiquitous, smart and interconnected electronic devices
with promising applications and services. Yet this trend is not
without risks. Built-in functionalities are necessary to enable
secure communications and/or to provide strong information
security guarantees. The fact that devices operate in the field
make them a very attractive target for adversaries with physical
access to them, who may attempt to break the security of the
system driven by e.g. economical incentives.
Fault injection attacks are a particular class of physical
attacks in which an adversary actively tampers with an
electronic circuit and/or its environmental conditions with
the aim of inducing errors. The exploitation of these errors
can allow to defeat security functionalities put in place by
designers. Examples are: bypassing security checks (e.g. a PIN
verification routine), perturb secure hardware modules (e.g.
random number generators), or extract secret cryptographic
keys from the device (e.g. Bellcore attack against the RSA
public-key cryptosystem [5] or DFA attacks against block
cipher implementations [4]).
Methods to inject faults to electronic circuits are various
and range from the classical approaches discovered by the US
pay TV hacking community in the beginning of the nineties
(e.g. insertion of clock glitches [8] or voltage spikes [2]), to
more advanced methods such as optical fault injection [17] or
electromagnetic (EM) fault injection [14].
In this work we focus on the injection of faults through the
EM channel. This technique has regained significant attention
in recent years, particularly due to: i) the possibility to inject
faults in a non-invasive manner, i.e. without need to perform
chip decapsulation, and ii) the enabling of fine grained temporal
and spatial resolutions, i.e. allowing to target local parts of a
circuit.
Related Work. In their seminal work on EM fault injection,
Quisquater and Samyde [14] used a camera flash-gun to inject
high voltages into the coil of an active probe, leading to
the generation of eddy currents in the surface of a chip
which caused memory errors. A few years later, Schmidt
and Hutter [16] employed a spark-gap transmitter to generate
strong EM bursts and radiation over a microcontroller, and
used this setup to break an RSA-CRT implementation. Since
then, different EM fault injection setups have appeared in
the literature. An overview of state-of-the-art constructions is
given by Maurine [9], who differentiates between two types
of platforms:
1) EM harmonic injection platforms, which use a micro-
antenna to expose a circuit to continuous sinusoidal EM
waves. Signals are provided by an RF generator typically
followed by a power amplifier. Such a setup has been
shown to disturb analogue blocks such as internal clock
generators or ring-oscillator based constructions [3].
2) EM pulse injection platforms, which use often hand-made
EM injectors to generate abrupt variations of the EM
field on the vicinity of a circuit. Signals are provided by
high-voltage pulse generators with low timing resolutions.
Such setups have been tested on cryptographic modu-
les [7], embedded microcontrollers [10], and generic,
exemplary circuits [11].
Our Contributions. In this work we focus on the second
category of platforms, namely, for EM pulse injection. Our
main contributions are:
1) We design and construct a platform to perform fault
attacks based on EM pulse injection. Instead of relying
on commercially available equipment for high-voltage
pulse generation, we develop our own flexible yet low-
cost solution for suitable EM pulse generation.
2) We validate our platform by applying a well-known
DFA attack against an (unprotected) AES software
implementation running on an embedded 8-bit controller.
II. A PLATFORM FOR EM PULSE INJECTION
A typical platform for EM pulse injection is made up of a
pulse injection circuit (PIC), an EM injector (EMI), a stepper
table (ST) and a desktop computer (PC), see Fig. 1. The device
under test (DUT) is placed on the ST table and under the
influence of the EMI. The DUT package may be partially or
totally removed to increase the effect of the pulse. The PC
can communicate with the DUT to trigger certain operations,
typically a security-related function such as data encryption or
signature generation.
Figure 1: High-level view of a typical EM pulse injection
platform.
The aim of the attack is the injection of a fault at a specific
time point during the run of the security-related function.
Triggering the PIC generates a high current transient in the
EMI coil, producing an abrupt magnetic pulse which couples
with the DUT. If injected successfully, the fault will alter the
expected execution of the function and, as it will be shown
later, this can then be exploited by an attacker in order to break
the security of the system.
The key elements of the platform are the EMI and the PIC
designs. With respect to the EMI there are several proposals
in the literature (see e.g. [12]) that can be selected. In our
experiments we have used a custom EMI made of a 6 loops coil
winded over a cylindrical ferrite nucleus of 1.5 mm diameter.
The design of the PIC module is not trivial because of its
specific requirements. It must produce transients with high
current during short periods of times, and triggered at a
very specific time instant. Earlier works [7], [10], [11] have
employed commercial high-voltage pulse generators (up to
200 V, current 8 A). Other works have used professional tools
for hardware security evaluation, e.g. Riscure’s Inspector FI
in [15], with currents up to 100 A.
These demanding requirements are hardly met in work-
benches assembled with standard laboratory equipment only,
because of the limitations of the equipments themselves and
the parasitic effects present in the interconnections. In what
follows we present our design of a PIC module achieving
similar requirements. In particular, the proposed platform is
able to inject faults for currents over 20 A.
A. Pulse Injection Circuit
The schematic of the PIC module is presented in Fig. 2
together with the power supply and control unit. The PIC
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Figure 2: Simplified schematic of our pulse injection circuit.
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Figure 3: The three phases of the pulse injector circuit.
module itself is shown inside the dotted line area and is made
of the following elements: a tank capacitor CT , a tank coil
LT , an IGBT transistor switch QS , two over-voltage protection
diodes D1 (Schottky) and DZ (Zener) and a return Schottky
diode D2. The EMI component is the coil LA.
The tank capacitor CT is a low parasitic capacitor which in
fact is made of a net of different rated capacitors connected in
parallel with a total capacitance of 3.5 mF. The tank coil LT
is low parasitic and high quality factor winded in a toroidal
nucleus of 200 mH. The IGBT transistor switch QS is a
fast power transistor controlled by an insulated gate whose
maximum ratings are 1.2 kV collector-to-emitter voltage, 30 A
pulsed current and ±20 V gate-to-emitter voltage. The over-
voltage protection (D1, DZ ) is used to protect the IGBT from
the induced coil over-voltage. It is rated by the Zener transistor
DZ whose break-down voltage is 1.2 kV. Finally, the return
diode D2 is a Schottky type to minimize the power dissipation
and it can withstand a non-repetitive peak surge current of 50 A
and a reverse voltage of 20 V. All the components inside the
PIC module are carefully routed and closely placed in order to
keep the parasitic effects due to cables and connectors down
to a minimum. Between all the elements the most crucial ones
are the tank coil LT , the EMI component LA and the Schottky
diode D2. The cost of all components in the PIC is around
50 euros.
Externally the PIC module is supplied by a power source
VDD of 20 V that is connected to the module using standard
banana cables whose parasitics are modeled by Rp and Lp
components. The triggering of the module is made by the
pulsing voltage source vP that switches ON/OFF QS with
gate-to-emitter voltages of 10/0 V.
B. Working principle
The operation of the PIC module follows a three phase cycle
as illustrated in Fig. 3. During the first phase (A) CT is charged
at VDD, in the second phase (B) it is discharged through LT
achieving a high current iLT and finally in the third phase (C)
this high current is derived through the EMI LA and quickly
discharged so that in the EMI itself the current rises and falls
during a very short time internal. Thus creating the magnetic
pulse in the ferrite nucleus.
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Figure 4: Voltages and currents involved in the PIC module.
In Fig. 4 the representation of the main currents and voltages
is shown. During phase A, CT is charged as formerly explained
and the main currents of the circuit are 0 because QS is OFF.
The current provided by the power source may be low because
of the long time phase. Typically more than 3 ms are allowed.
To prepare the EMI shot, phase B is activated by switching
ON QS after rising vP = 10 V. Rapidly CT discharges through
LT and QS forming a current loop as illustrated in Fig. 3.
These three components form a second order filter that presents
an overshoot in current iLT as illustrated in Fig. 4. Due to
the large values and high quality factors of CT and LT the
overshoot is significantly high, in our case larger than 20 A or
one order of magnitude more than the current provided by the
VDD. During this current increase the contribution of VDD is
marginal because of the relative long time constant response
of the cabling parasitic components (Rp, Lp) and the limits
of the power source. If QS is kept ON for a period larger
than 500 µs, then the iLT overshoot would damp reaching the
VDD limiting current, 1 A in our case. Similarly, vCT would
decrease to few volts, the cutting voltage of VDD. This later
case is illustrated by discontinued lines in the figure.
However, once iLT reaches the maximum (time tC in Fig.
4 before 500 µs after tB) we can switch OFF QS by setting
vP = 0. The strong reactive behavior of LT induces a sudden
voltage spike in node vQS that can easily reach 1 kV or even
more, it will depend on the LA inductance. As a result the
circuit consisting of LT , LA and D2 is closed and the maximum
current iLT loops through LA (see Fig. 3). The rising current
slope in LA is very steep as illustrated in Fig. 4, typically
400 mA ns−1. This current loop lasts in C until the magnetic
energy accumulated in LT dissipates completely, slightly more
than hundred microseconds later than tC . In Tab. I the current
equations involved in each phase are listed concisely.
Table I: Currents present in each phase of the PIC.
Phase Currents
A
iCT = −iDD iQS = 0
iLT = 0 iLA = 0
B
iCT ↑ iQS = iCT
iLT = iCT iLA = 0
C
iCT = −iDD iQS = 0
iLT ↓ iLA = iLT
C. Characterization
Measurements of the electromagnetic effects induced by the
EMI are made. The probe shown in Fig. 5 is used. It consists
of a flat coil of 6.6 mm diameter with 7 turns that is connected
to a 50 Ω resistor at which the current iprobe is measured. The
EMI component is placed over the surface of the probe at a
distance of 3.24 mm.
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Figure 5: Current probe and its layout with the EMI component.
In Fig. 6 oscilloscope screen-shoots are presented with the
currents measured in the EMI component iLA and the probe
iprobe. The right view is of a large scale and the large dissipating
period of iLA can be clearly appreciated. It lasts about 120 µs.
In addition the increase is seen as a vertical transition in
which the transition time cannot be appreciated. At the top of
this transition the probe current iprobe is shown like a narrow
impulse. On the left view a zoom of the rise transition is made.
It can be observed that iLA over-shoots at 48 A after 100 ns to
immediately decrease at a steady current of 28 A. The impulse
generated in the probe iprobe reaches a maximum of 800 mA.
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Figure 6: Oscilloscope screenshots of the EMI current iLA and
probe induced current iprobe. At the right large and at the left
detailed views are presented.
Figure 7 presents the control unit voltage vP and the currents
at the tank coil iLT and the power transistor iQS in phase B.
For comparison reasons here the transistor is not switched OFF
so that the current is let to decrease at the level of the power
supply iDD. It can clearly be appreciated that the maximum
current is 23 times larger than the power supply one. Also,
time instants tB and tC are labeled. In normal operation after
time tC this current (iQS) would be instantly cut at zero.
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Figure 7: Oscilloscope screenshot of the power transistor
current iQS = iLT when the transistor is kept permanently
ON. Maximum current in relation to the power supply iDD
can be appreciated. Time instants tB and tC are labelled.
The PIC module presented in this section is a particular
instantiation of our overall design. Therefore it can be scaled
up if necessary. In particular, the present design can be
replicated up to four times and connected in a start like
shape configuration around the EMI component to multiply
the current injection by this same factor while maintaining
the same transition times. In this case, however, the EMI
component would need to be modified to accommodate the
higher currents.
III. PLATFORM VALIDATION
In this section we provide an experimental validation of our
fault injection platform by performing a classical key-recovery
DFA attack [4] on a cryptographic block cipher implementation.
We select as DUT an 8-bit ATmega328P microcontroller
mounted on an Arduino Uno board. The device, manufactured
by using a 0.35 µm process, runs at 16 MHz. In order to
maximize the effect of the EM pulse injection, we have exposed
the back-side of the chip by removing the epoxy layer using
mechanical grinding and milling (as described in [6]) without
damaging the chip. The device is programmed with a software
implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a
symmetric encryption algorithm standardized by NIST [1]. This
cipher takes as input a 128-bit input plaintext P and outputs
the corresponding 128-bit ciphertext C = Ek(P ) encrypted
with a 128-bit secret key k, internally stored in EEPROM
memory. The implementation takes around 270 µs to execute
(equivalent to 4366 cycles at 16 MHz).
Our complete experimental setup contains the elements
depicted in Fig. 1. We place the Arduino Uno board on
top of the ST and interface it to an external PC through a
serial communication channel. The PC can generate and send
arbitrary plaintexts P to the device and fetch the corresponding
ciphertexts C. The voltage levels and pulse periods of the
power supply and control unit driving the PIC are remotely
configurable from the PC. In our experiments, we additionally
use an oscilloscope to monitor the power consumption of the
DUT, i.e. by measuring the voltage drop of a 0.1Ω shunt
resistor in series with the circuit ground line. As explained
later, we use this information to locate the temporal point in
which to inject the fault. Finally, we position the EMI above
the depackaged DUT. A close-up view of our setup is shown
in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Close-up view of our experimental setup: PIC with
EMI above DUT.
A. Piret’s DFA on AES
Extracting secret cryptographic keys from block cipher imple-
mentations is a well-researched topic. One of the most classic
attacks, which we select for our experiments, is described by
Piret and Quisquater in [13] and targets implementations of
Figure 8: Output propagation of a byte-fault error at the beginning of Round 9 of AES-128.
the AES. We apply the attack on an instantiation of the AES-
128, the version of AES that uses a 128-bit secret key k. The
AES-128 takes as input a data block of 128 bits P , which is
internally arranged as a 4× 4 matrix of bytes (the so-called
AES state). The AES state is gradually modified by iterating
over 10 transformation rounds which perform the following
internal operations: AddRoundKey consists on a byte-wise
XOR between AES state and AES round sub-key, SubBytes
is a byte-wise non-linear operation which can be instantiated
as a substitution table, ShiftRows performs a row-wise
rearrangement of the AES state bytes, and MixColumns
performs a linear combination of bytes within a column. Note
that MixColumns is not applied in Round 10.
The DFA attack by Piret and Quisquater assumes an
adversary capable of injecting a random fault into a single
byte of the AES state before the MixColumns operation in
Round 9. From the properties of the cipher, such an error will
propagate to the ciphertext affecting 4 out of 16 bytes. This is
illustrated in Figure 8, assuming a fault is injected into the first
byte of the AES state. We denote the injected error by f , which
is the XOR difference between the correct and erroneous value
of the byte s∗00 = s00 ⊕ f . The error f propagates linearly
until the end of Round 9, affecting a full column of the AES
state. At the beginning of Round 10, the error is transformed
through the non-linear SubBytes operation and ultimately
reaches the output ciphertext affecting bytes at positions 1,8,11
and 14, i.e. c∗1 = c1 ⊕ F1, c∗8 = c8 ⊕ F4, c∗11 = c11 ⊕ F3 and
c∗14 = c14 ⊕ F2.
Given a correct/incorrect ciphertext pair, i.e. (C,C∗), it is
then possible to construct the following set of equations using
the equalities between f , 2f and 3f at the end of Round 9:
S−1(c1 ⊕ k1)⊕ S−1(c∗1 ⊕ k1) =
2× [S−1(c14 ⊕ k14)⊕ S−1(c∗14 ⊕ k14)] (1)
S−1(c14 ⊕ k14)⊕ S−1(c∗14 ⊕ k14) =
S−1(c11 ⊕ k11)⊕ S−1(c∗11 ⊕ k11) (2)
S−1(c11 ⊕ k11)⊕ S−1(c∗11 ⊕ k11) =
3× [S−1(c8 ⊕ k8)⊕ S−1(c∗8 ⊕ k8)], (3)
where S−1 is the inverse SubBytes operation and
(k1, k8, k11, k14) are secret key bytes used in that last execution
of AddRoundKey. Iterating over all possible 28 values of the
sub-key bytes in these equations allows to narrow down the
list of possible candidates. In fact, and as explained in [13], if
the adversary has 3 correct/incorrect ciphertext pairs the values
(k1, k8, k11, k14) can be recovered with a 100% probability.
Note that the adversary does not need to know the value f of
the injected fault, since the attack exploits the propagation of
this error to the output ciphertext.
B. Results
Reproducing the DFA attack in our experimental setup
requires an adequate tunning of the temporal and spatial
settings of our fault injection platform. Namely, we need to
ensure that i) the EM pulse is generated at the exact time when
the device performs operations at the beginning of Round 9,
and ii) the EMI is positioned at a suitable spot above the
surface of the DUT that results in computation errors.
We first set the temporal occurrence of the fault by using
the information provided by the power consumption waveform
of the circuit during an AES execution. An example is shown
in Fig. 10 (bottom). The 10 transformation rounds (highlighted
by the vertical dotted lines) yield very similar patterns in the
power consumption waveform, which allows us to identify the
time instant where Round 9 begins. By setting delays to our
control unit we can synchronize the instant where vP = 0, i.e.
where phase (C) is activated, to the beginning of computations
in Round 9. This is shown in Fig. 10 (top). We then set the
spatial resolution by placing the EMI at different positions over
the depackaged DUT using the ST. Determining whether the
position enables the attack is done experimentally. We select
a random plaintext P , collect its corresponding ciphertext C
(without faults), and then we run our fault injection setup at
different positions until we obtain an erroneous ciphertext C∗.
Quite naturally, not all injected faults correspond to the
fault model assumed in Piret’s attack. So we need to perform
some fine-tuning trials in order to find a suitable temporal and
spatial location that results in an error in exactly four ciphertext
bytes. These should correspond to (c∗1, c
∗
8, c
∗
11, c
∗
14), i.e. same
as depicted in Fig. 8. In our experimental setup, the desired
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Figure 10: Oscilloscope captures during AES execution: value
of vP (top), normalized value of iCC (bottom). Vertical lines
show the different rounds of AES.
faults can be obtained when placing the EMI on a corner
above the decapsulated DUT, indicating that this part of the
chip layout contains some components that are susceptible to
the injected EM pulse. With this configuration, we can obtain
3 suitable (C,C∗) pairs that allow to recover (k1, k8, k11, k14).
The remaining secret key bytes are simply obtained by repeating
the attack to generate errors on different ciphertext bytes. This
can be done by shifting the temporal occurrence of vP = 0 until
we observe errors at positions (c∗2, c
∗
5, c
∗
12, c
∗
15), (c
∗
3, c
∗
6, c
∗
9, c
∗
16)
and (c∗4, c
∗
7, c
∗
10, c
∗
13), respectively.
C. Discussion
In order to wrap-up our analysis, we provide here a brief
explanation of the actual effect of the injected fault to the DUT.
The SubBytes transformation is typically implemented in
software by means of a look-up table called Sbox. Since the
Sbox table is an algorithm constant, it is instantiated directly
in non-volatile memory. The implementation of SubBytes
is thus a simple iteration over all state bytes performing the
substitution si = Sbox(si) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 16. In our DUT, the
instruction LPM is the one used to load elements from an
array in program memory to a register. We have identified this
operation as the one that is affected by the EM pulse injection.
The error caused by the fault is simple: the instruction fails to
load the desired value and, instead, it stores into the register the
previous value on the bus. Put differently: given two consecutive
instructions si−1 = Sbox(si−1) and si = Sbox(si), a fault
injected on the latter operation will cause si = Sbox(si−1).
In practice, and due to the properties of the algorithm, this
effect resembles a random fault model as assumed in [13],
therefore enabling the attack. Note also that the effect of the
fault is restricted to this particular operation, i.e. we observe
no alterations in the subsequent instructions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fault injection attacks are amongst the most threating
techniques that an adversary can use to undermine the security
of embedded devices. In this work we have described our efforts
to build a suitable and low-cost platform for EM fault injection,
which can be used by designers for evaluation purposes. Our
design can be scaled-up to accommodate stronger requirements
and improved by selecting more directional EMI elements. We
plan to investigate these aspects in future works.
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